

WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

September 29, 1978

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
MEMORANDUM FOR:

*NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ✓
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY

SUBJECT: Guidance on Public Queries Related to
Declassification of the "Fact of"
Photoreconnaissance Satellites

The attached reflects the Administration policy regarding
public queries to be observed by all Departments and Agencies
commencing October 2, 1978. All public queries are to be
referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Public
Affairs at this time for response.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosure
Press Guidance

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

CLASSIFIED BY Zbigniew Brzezinski
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2)

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000800040016-4

Press Guidance on Questions Related to President's Statement
on U.S. Satellite Photoreconnaissance

Comments shall not go beyond the President's direction to acknowledge that the U.S. conducts satellite photoreconnaissance including acknowledgement that photoreconnaissance is one of the NTMS used to verify compliance with SALT and other arms control agreements. In particular, spokesmen are not to comment on any questions relating to: (1) the capabilities of these systems; (2) their operation; (3) comparison to other U.S. or foreign reconnaissance systems; (4) uses of photoreconnaissance satellites other than the "generic" fact and/or support of arms control agreements; (5) other types of classified satellites; (6) specific form and dissemination of information obtained by photosatellites; (7) uses of such information other than for "national security requirements" and/or verification of arms control agreements; (8) any other aspect of overhead reconnaissance.

To foster uniformity and best protect security, the only office to respond to inquiries from the public at this time concerning "fact of" and "facts about" photoreconnaissance activities of the U.S. will be the Office of the Secretary of Defense. All queries will be referred to OSD/PA.

Questions and authorized answers are attached. Unless a question can be answered by reference to the President's statement, this guidance, or the attached Q's and A's, OSD spokesmen shall clear all other responses to queries with the National Security Council.

CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526
EXEMPTION CATEGORY BB(2)

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- Q. How good is the quality of the pictures our satellites take?
- A. Very good. I cannot go into specific detail regarding the capabilities of these systems.
- Q. How often do we photograph a given area?
- A. Photoreconnaissance coverage is contingent on national security requirements and requirements to verify compliance with arms control agreements. I cannot discuss the specific operational characteristics of our photo-reconnaissance systems.
- Q. What do we photograph from satellites?
- A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.
- Q. Do we take satellite photographs of other countries besides the Soviet Union?
- A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.
- Q. Do we ever photograph the U.S. from space?
- A. Yes. Periodically, we operate these systems over the U.S. in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.
- Q. Who operates the satellites we use to verify arms control agreements?
- A. Those satellites are operated by the Department of Defense at the direction of the President and the National Security Council. I cannot comment on details of operational control.

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Q. Who sees the results? Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000800040016-4

A. The results of satellite photoreconnaissance are available to appropriate analysts and policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches.

Q. Have we ever shown photographs taken by these satellites to the Soviets?

A. No.

Q. Do we show these satellite photographs to our Allies?

A. We share information with our Allies.

Q. Does the Soviet Union also use satellite photography?

A. Yes.

Q. How can we be sure that the Soviets won't destroy our satellites?

A. The SALT ONE agreements and the draft SALT TWO treaty specifically prohibit Soviet interference with U.S. national technical means of verification which include photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition, we are currently engaged in discussions with the Soviets aimed at limiting anti-satellite capabilities. The White House statement on space policy issued last June reaffirms that an attack on a U.S. satellite would clearly be a hostile act.


Q. Is it legal to take pictures from outer space?

A. Yes, the use of photoreconnaissance satellites is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty of 1977 and is not precluded by any principle of international law. The SALT ONE agreements specifically provide that national technical means will be used for verification of compliance with the agreements. The draft SALT TWO agreement nearing completion also refers to the use of such means of verification.

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"A copy of the text and a set of color slides for the industrial security indoctrination "Special Project Security in the 70's" as presented at the Contractor Symposium at Headquarters in May 1978 has been sent to the contractor. Audit teams will review the contractor use and effectiveness of these materials during the audit at the facility and report with other audit matters."

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